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COMMENTSI
The Plain View Doctrine After Horton v.
California: Fourth Amendment Concerns
and the Problem of Pretext
I. Introduction
In Horton v. California' the United States Supreme Court held
that the warrantless seizure of evidence in plain view is permissible
under the Fourth Amendment2 even if the discovery of that evidence
was not inadvertent. Under Coolidge v. New Hampshire4 the
Fourth Amendment had been deemed to prohibit the warrantless
seizure of evidence in plain view unless the discovery of that evidence
was inadvertent. 5 Coolidge was, however, a plurality opinion in that
only three other members of the Court joined Justice Stewart's anal-
I. 110 S. Ct. 2301 (1990). The facts of Horton, as well as an analysis of the opinion of
the United States Supreme Court, are set forth later in this Comment. See infra text accom-
panying notes 76-118.
2. The Fourth Amendment provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no War-
rants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be
seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
3. Horton, 110 S. Ct. at 2304.
4. 403 U.S. 443 (1971). In Coolidge, pursuant to a warrant, police seized and searched
an automobile in orde'r to find physical evidence implicating the automobile's owner in a mur-
der. When the warrant was later held invalid, the prosecution sought to justify the seizure of
the automobile under several exceptions to the warrant requirement, including the plain view
doctrine. Id. at 464.
5. Id. at 469-71.
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ysis of the inadvertence limitation on the plain view doctrine.6 As
such, there was a degree of uncertainty regarding the status of Coo-
lidge as binding authority on the issue of inadvertence. In the wake
of Horton, it is clear that inadvertent discovery is not a constitution-
ally mandated prerequisite to the warrantless seizure of evidence in
plain view. 8
This Comment argues that the inadvertent discovery rule must
be restored in order to preserve the Fourth Amendment prohibition
against unreasonable seizures and the Fourth Amendment require-
ment that a warrant, issued upon probable cause, particularly de-
scribe the thing to be seized. Absent exigent circumstances, a war-
rantless seizure is a per se unreasonable invasion of an individual's
constitutionally protected possessory interest in property.9 When the
discovery of evidence in plain view is not inadvertent, i.e., when "the
police know in advance the location of the evidence and intend to
seize it,""' no exigency prevents a police officer from procuring a
warrant issued upon probable cause and particularly describing the
item to be seized." Thus, the warrantless seizure of evidence in plain
view, not inadvertently discovered, is a per se unreasonable invasion
of an individual's constitutionally protected possessory interest in
property and violative of the Fourth Amendment. 2 To permit the
warrantless seizure of evidence that was not inadvertently discovered
seriously undermines the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement. 3
6. Id. at 445. Joining Justice Stewart's analysis of the inadvertence limitation on the
plain view doctrine in Coolidge were Justice Douglas, Justice Brennan, and Justice Marshall.
Id. That Justice Brennan and Justice Marshall continue to view inadvertent discovery as a
constitutional requirement is evidenced by their dissent in Horton. Horton v. California, 110 S.
Ct. 2301, 2311 (1990) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
7. California, Idaho and Utah have rejected the inadvertent discovery requirement of
Coolidge. See North v. Superior Court, 502 P.2d 1305 (Cal. 1972); State v. Pontier, 518 P.2d
969 (Idaho 1974); State v. Romero, 660 P.2d 715 (Utah 1983).
8. Horton, 110 S. Ct. at 2304.
9. United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 701 (1983). "in thc ordinary case, the Court
has viewed a seizure of personal property as per se unreasonable within the meaning of the
Fourth Amendment unless it is accomplished pursuant to a judicial warrant issued upon prob-
able cause and particularly describing the items to be seized." Id. (citing Marron v. United
States, 275 U.S. 192, 196 (1927)).
10. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 470 (1971).
II. Id. at 470-71.
12. Horton v. California, 110 S. Ct. 2301, 2311-12 (1990) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (cit-
ing United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 701 (1983)).
13. Coolidge, 403 U.S. at 469-71. The Coolidge plurality observed that:
If the initial intrusion is bottomed upon a warrant that fails to mention a partic-
ular object, though the police know its location and intend to seize it, then there
is a violation of the express constitutional requirement of "Warrants ... partic-
ularly describing ... (the] things to be seized." The initial intrusion may, of
course, be legitimated not by a warrant but by one of the exceptions to the
warrant requirement, such as hot pursuit or search incident to lawful arrest. But
PLAIN VIEW DOCTRINE
This Comment argues, however, that not only must the inadver-
tent discovery rule be restored, but an absolute prohibition on
pretextual Fourth Amendment activity14 must be set forth as well.
The plain view doctrine must not be relied on as part of a pretext to
make an otherwise unjustified warrantless seizure. 15 If a police of-
ficer enters a suspect's premises pursuant to a warrant to search for
evidence of one crime-when the officer is really only interested in
discovery and seizure of evidence of another crime for which he
lacks the necessary probable cause to secure a warrant-the plain
view doctrine is being relied on as part of a pretext to make an oth-
erwise unjustified warrantless seizure.' 6 Complete elimination of
pretextual Fourth Amendment activity will often require an inquiry
into the subjective motivation of the police officer."' Only by engag-
ing in such a subjective inquiry can police conduct that may be ob-
jectively constitutional be revealed as a pretext to make an otherwise
unjustified, and subjectively unconstitutional, warrantless seizure.'
This Comment concludes that for a plain view seizure to be constitu-
tionally valid, the discovery of the evidence must be inadvertent and
no pretext can exist.
II. The Plain View Doctrine Under Coolidge v. New Hampshire
Until Horton was decided, Coolidge embodied the modern in-
terpretation of the plain view doctrine. The plain view doctrine is
to extend the scope of such an intrusion to the seizure of objects . . . which the
police know in advance they will find in plain view and intend to seize it, would
fly in the face of the basic rule that no amount of probable cause can justify a
warrantless seizure.
Id. at 471 (footnote omitted).
14. See John M. Burkoff, The Pretext Search Doctrine Returns After Never Leaving, 66
DET. C.L. REv. 363 (1989). "Pretextual fourth amendment activity" refers to "searches or
seizures (including arrests) that are undertaken by law enforcement officers for reasons that do
not constitute a proper legal justification for such activity." Id. at 364. This Comment ad-
dresses the problem of police officers relying on the plain view doctrine as part of a pretext to
make an otherwise unjustified warrantless seizure. If a police officer enters a suspect's premises
pursuant to a warrant for crime B, when the officer is really only interested in discovering in
plain view and seizing evidence of crime A, for which he lacks the necessary probable cause to
secure a warrant, the plain view doctrine is being relied on as part of a pretext to make an
otherwise unjustified warrantless seizure. The actual reason for the search of suspect's prem-
ises was not to investigate crime B. Instead, the actual reason for the search was to seize
evidence of crime A without the requisite probable cause to do so. When the officer seizes the
evidence of crime A, he does so "for reasons that do not constitute a proper legal justification."
Id. See infra text accompanying notes 142-53.
15. See Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 743 (1983) (quoting Coolidge v. New Hamp-
shire, 403 U.S. 443, 470 (1971)).
16. Horton v. California, 110 S. Ct. 2301, 2313 (1990) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
17. Burkoff, supra note 14, at 373.
18. Burkoff, supra note 14, at 373.
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nothing more than an exception to the Fourth Amendment's warrant
requirement.19 Under Coolidge, however, the exception was fairly
narrowly drawn. The general requirement that a seizure must be au-
thorized by a warrant was excused only in the limited circumstances
outlined in Coolidge.2" The Coolidge plurality held that the warrant-
less seizure of evidence in plain view is permissible under the Fourth
Amendment only when: (1) the police have a prior valid justification
for the intrusion;2" (2) the discovery of the evidence is inadvertent;22
and (3) it is immediately apparent to the police that the evidence is
incriminating.
23
Justice Stewart explained in Coolidge that when an otherwise
lawful search is in progress and the police inadvertently discover a
piece of evidence, it would be "a needless inconvenience, and some-
times dangerous - to the evidence or to the police themselves - to
require them to ignore it until they have obtained a warrant particu-
larly describing it."'24 However, Justice Stewart observed that "the
situation is altogether different ' 25 when the discovery of certain evi-
dence is anticipated -- when "the police know in advance the loca-
tion of the evidence and intend to seize it."26 Justice Stewart con-
cluded that when police know in advance that they will find certain
evidence and they intend to seize that evidence, the requirement of a
warrant before seizure imposes no constitutionally cognizable incon-
venience in a legal system that deems warrantless seizures per se
19. Other recognized exceptions to the warrant requirement include: Inventory searches,
South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364 (1976); search incident to arrest, Chimel v. Califor-
nia, 395 U.S. 752 (1969); hot pursuit, Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967); automobile
exception, Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925). The Supreme Court has emphasized
that exceptions to the warrant requirement are "few," "specifically established," and "well
delineated." Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967). In Coolidge itself the Court
observed that if the warrant requirement "is to be a true guide to constitutional police action,
rather than just a pious phrase, then '[tihe exceptions cannot be enthroned into the rule.' "
Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 481 (1971) (quoting United States v. Rabinowitz,
339 U.S. 56, 80 (1950) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting)).
20. Coolidge, 403 U.S. at 464-71.
21. Id. at 466. The prior valid intrusion element is satisfied when the intrusion is based
on a warrant or on one of the recognized exceptions to the warrant requirement. See supra
note 19.
22. Coolidge, 403 U.S. at 466. Horton makes clear that inadvertent discovery is no
longer constitutionally required. Horton v. California, I10 S. Ct. 2301, 2304 (1990).
23. Coolidge, 403 U.S. at 466. In Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 742 n.7 (1983), the
Court suggested, but did not decide, that the immediately apparent element required that
police have probable cause to believe that they are confronted with evidence of a crime. In
Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 326 (1987), the Court expressly held that probable cause is
the standard.
24. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 468 (1971).
25. Coolidge, 403 U.S. at 470.
26. Id.
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unreasonable absent exigent circumstances.27 Thus, for nearly two
decades Coolidge stood for the proposition that to permit a police
officer to make a warrantless seizure of evidence in plain view when
the officer knew the location of that evidence, but did not obtain a
warrant, 28 would violate "the express constitutional requirement of
'Warrants . . . particularly describing . . . [the] things to be
seized.' "29
Justice Stewart's analysis of the plain view doctrine, and specifi-
cally his discussion of the inadvertence requirement, came under im-
mediate criticism. Both Justice Black and Justice White specifically
dissented from the plurality's requirement of inadvertence. Justice
Black sharply disagreed with Justice Stewart's conclusion that inad-
vertent discovery was a factor common to all plain view cases that
had come before the Court prior to Coolidge.30 Justice White was
particularly critical of the inadvertence requirement, calling it a "pu-
nitive and extravagant application of the exclusionary rule." 31
Certain things the Coolidge plurality said, and failed to say, en-
gendered considerable confusion. For example, language in Justice
Stewart's discussion of the plain view doctrine indicated that inad-
vertent discovery was not required for the warrantless seizure of con-
traband, stolen property, or inherently dangerous objects.32 Several
courts have embraced this language and interpreted the inadvertent
discovery rule as inapplicable to contraband, stolen property, or in-
herently dangerous objects. 3 The fact that the evidence seized in
Horton was contraband raises questions as to why the Supreme
Court did not simply hold that even though the evidence was not
inadvertently discovered, the seizure was nonetheless constitutionally
valid because inadvertent discovery was not required for the war-
rantless seizure of contraband under Coolidge. While such narrow
grounds were available, the Supreme Court has never stated that the
inadvertence requirement is inapplicable to contraband.34
27. Id. at 470-71.
28. See Horton v. California, 110 S. Ct. 2301, 2312 (1990) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
29. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 471 (1971).
30. Coolidge, 403 U.S. at 506 (Black, J., dissenting).
31. Id. at 517 (White, J., dissenting).
32. Id. at 471-72.
33. See State v. Hamilton, 573 A.2d 1197, 1201 (Conn. 1990); see also United States v.
Johnson, 707 F.2d 317, 321 (8th Cir. 1983); United States v. Thompson, 700 F.2d 944, 951-52
(5th Cir. 1983); United States v. Bellina, 665 F.2d 1335, 1346 (4th Cir. 1981); United States
v. Vargus, 621 F.2d 54, 56 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 854 (1980).
34. See Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730 (1983), wherein the item seized from plain view
was narcotics, and the Court undertook an inadvertence analysis. Lower courts that continued
to interpret the inadvertent discovery rule as inapplicable to contraband, stolen property, or
inherently dangerous objects had ignored Texas v. Brown in this regard.
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Probably the most troublesome aspect of the Coolidge decision
lies in what it failed to say. Nowhere did Justice Stewart define the
degree of expectation required to make a discovery inadvertent.3 5
This most problematic aspect of the Coolidge plurality's analysis of
the plain view doctrine will be addressed in considerable detail later
in this Comment.
Rarely since Coolidge has the Supreme Court squarely ad-
dressed the plain view doctrine in general and the inadvertent discov-
ery rule in particular. In Texas v. Brown,0 a plurality opinion, Jus-
tice Rehnquist observed that Justice Stewart's analysis of the plain
view doctrine in Coolidge did not command a majority of the Court
and that the analysis, including the inadvertence requirement, was
"not a binding precedent." 7
Nevertheless, Justice Rehnquist went on to say that because it
was a considered opinion of four members of the 'Court, the Coolidge
plurality "should obviously be the point of reference for further dis-
cussion of the issue."38 In a concurring opinion in Brown, Justice
Powell expressed his feeling that the widespread acceptance of Coo-
lidge weighed against a reformulation of the plain view doctrine.39
Justice O'Connor later reiterated 40 the viewpoint that Coolidge was
the touchstone for consideration of the constitutionality of plain view
seizures."
Though it abandons the inadvertence requirement, Horton ad-
heres to the other two Coolidge preconditions for a valid warrantless
seizure of evidence discovered in plain view. 42 Specifically, under
Horton a police officer must have a prior valid justification for the
intrusion,'43 and it must be immediately apparent to the officer in-
volved that the evidence is incriminating." To this extent Coolidge
has survived.
35. Harry Kalven, Jr., The Supreme Court 1970 Term, 85 HARV. L. REv. 3, 244
(1971).
36. 460 U.S. 730 (1983).
37. Id. at 737.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 746 (Powell, J., concurring).
40. Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321 (1987) (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
41. Id. at 334 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).




III. Administering the Plain View Doctrine Under Coolidge: How
Inadvertent Is "Inadvertent"?
As noted, probably the most serious problem with the Coolidge
plurality's discussion of the plain view doctrine and its inadvertence
requirement is that Justice Stewart failed to define the degree of ex-
pectation required to make a discovery of evidence by the police "in-
advertent" in the constitutional sense. ' 5 Given this lack of guidance,
various approaches to administering the inadvertence requirement
have developed throughout the federal and state courts.
A. Rejection of the Inadvertent Discovery Rule
The courts of three states have rejected outright the inadvertent
discovery requirement.4 6 The Supreme Court of California did so in
the case of North v. Superior Court.47 The North court concluded
that the inadvertence requirement was espoused by only a plurality
of the Supreme Court in Coolidge and therefore was not binding
authority.48 Using the same reasoning, the Supreme Court of Idaho
followed suit in State v. Pontier.49 In State v. Romero5" the Supreme
Court of Utah, also noting the plurality status of Coolidge, declined
to require that the discovery of evidence in plain view be
inadvertent.51
B. The Good Faith Standard
In some jurisdictions, provided the police officer acted in good
faith, discovery of an item of evidence may be deemed "inadvertent"
45. Kalven, supra note 35, at 244.
46. See North v. Superior Court, 502 P.2d 1305 (Cal. 1972); State v. Pontier, 518 P.2d
969 (Idaho 1974); State v. Romero, 660 P.2d 715 (Utah 1983).
47. 502 P.2d 1305, 1308 (Cal. 1972).
48. Id. The Supreme Court of California stated:
If the plurality opinion in Coolidge were entitled to binding effect as precedent,
we would have difficulty distinguishing its holding from the instant case, for the
discovery of petitioners car was no more "inadvertent" than in Coolidge. How-
ever, that portion of Justice Stewart's plurality opinion which proposed the adop-
tion of new restrictions to the "plain view" rule was signed by only four mem-
bers of the Court.
Id.
49. 518 P.2d 969, 974 (Idaho 1974). The Supreme Court of Idaho observed that there
was "no compelling reason to require that the discovery of evidence in plain view must be
inadvertent before it can be seized and used as competent evidence." Id. "Since the inadver-
tent requirement was not espoused by a majority of the [United States Supreme] Court, it is
not binding on this court as precedent." .d.
50. 660 P.2d 715 (Utah 1983).
51. Id. at 718 n.3. The Supreme Court of Utah declined to require inadvertence because
"it was specified by only a plurality of the justices" in Coolidge and because "inadvertence
was omitted as a separate requirement" in Washington v. Chrisman, 455 U.S. I (1982). Id.
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even if the officer had probable cause to believe the evidence was
located there and could have obtained a warrant to seize that evi-
dence.5 2 This broad interpretation of the inadvertence requirement is
nicely illustrated by the Second Circuit's decision in United States v.
$10,000 in United States Currency.5" In that case the court proposed
that instead of examining whether the police had probable cause to
know certain evidence would be discovered in plain view, the focus of
a suppression hearing "is better directed toward the good faith of the
police action when fully viewed."5 " Under this approach, the exis-
tence of probable cause to search is irrelevant with regard to
whether evidence was discovered inadvertently. 5 As such, the dis-
covery of a particular piece of evidence may be deemed inadvertent
even though a police officer could have made a probable cause show-
ing and obtained a search warrant for the evidence, but did not do so
out of a good faith belief that he lacked sufficient information to
make the necessary showing and secure a warrant.56 The court in
$10,000 in United States Currency concluded that as long as "the
search is conducted in a manner reasonable in duration and inten-
sity, the property seized may be found to be inadvertently discovered
in plain view.
'57
Whether Coolidge supports such a good faith standard is open
to question. One court has said that "[i]t is apparent that Coolidge
does not support a good faith standard but rather it was intended to
prevent a plain view seizure when the police knew in advance the
location of an item and intended to seize it."'5 8 It has been argued
elsewhere that Coolidge does not support a good faith standard be-
52. See, e.g., United States v. $10,000 in United States Currency, 780 F.2d 213 (2d Cir.
1986) (warrants executed at two premises for drug sales, one warrant failed to specify money
as an item to be seized; seizure of money is permissible despite preexisting probable cause
because "the police in good faith failed to mention an item in the warrant"); United States v.
Wright, 641 F.2d 602 (8th Cir. 1981) (discovery of gun deemed inadvertent though officers
could likely have obtained a warrant for the gun), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 1021 (1981); State v.
Oliver, 341 N.W.2d 744 (Iowa 1983) (discovery of magazines deemed inadvertent despite pre-
existing probable cause because "the magazines were omitted from the warrant application by
oversight rather than intention"); State v. Hembd, 767 P.2d 864 (Mont. 1989) (discovery of
drugs deemed inadvertent because officer relied on prosecutor's belief that there was no proba-
ble cause).
53. 780 F.2d 213 (2d Cir. 1986).
54. Id. at 219.
55. Id. at 218.
56. Id. at 219.
57. Id.
58. State v. Hamilton, 573 A.2d 1197, 1203 (Conn. 1990). In Hamilton, the Supreme
Court of Connecticut rejected the good faith standard set forth by the Second Circuit in
United States v. $10,000 in United States Currency, 780 F.2d 213 (2d Cir. 1986). Id. Instead,
the Hamilton Court adopted the probable cause standard discussed infra notes 61-75 and
accompanying text.
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cause the officers in Coolidge seized defendant's automobile in what
could be described as good faith reliance on a warrant."9 Only after
an existing warrant was invalidated because it had not been issued
by a neutral and detached magistrate did the prosecution argue that
the plain view doctrine authorized the warrantless seizure of the
automobile.6"
C. The Probable Cause Standard
In many jurisdictions a probable cause analysis is applied in or-
der to determine whether evidence not particularly described in the
warrant was discovered inadvertently.61 Under this probable cause
analysis, "inadvertence" is construed to mean "that the police must
be without probable cause to believe evidence would be discovered
until they actually observe it in the course of an otherwise justified
search."62 The reasoning behind this probable cause standard is
sound. If a police officer truly lacks probable cause with respect to
certain evidence, the officer cannot be expected to obtain a warrant
to search for that evidence because no warrant would issue. The of-
ficer should not be penalized for failing to obtain a warrant. 6
"[U]nless the police had the ability and opportunity to obtain a war-
rant prior to the seizure and failed to do so, the inadvertency re-
quirement of the plain view doctrine has not been violated." 4
59. Howard E. Wallin, The Uncertain Scope of the Plain View Doctrine, 16 U. BALT. L.
REV. 266, 278 (1987).
60. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 453 (1971).
61. See, e.g., United States v. Hare, 589 F.2d 1291 (6th Cir. 1979); People v. Stoppel,
637 P.2d 384 (Colo. 1981); State v. Howard, 448 So.2d 713 (La. Ct. App. 1984); Common-
wealth v. Cefalo, 409 N.E.2d 719 (Mass. 1980); People v. Myshock, 321 N.W.2d 849 (Mich.
Ct. App. 1982); State v. Clark, 592 S.W.2d 709 (Mo. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 847
(1980); State v. Benner, 533 N.E.2d 701 (Ohio 1988), cert. denied, I10 S. Ct. 1834 (1990).
Some jurisdictions utilize the probable cause standard while interpreting the inadvertence re-
quirement as inapplicable to contraband, stolen goods, or inherently dangerous objects. See
State v. Hamilton, 573 A.2d 1197, 1201 (Conn. 1990).
62. United States v. Hare, 589 F.2d 1291, 1294 (6th Cir. 1979). Professor LaFave has
commented that "[i]f the 'inadvertent' discovery limitation is to make any sense at all, how-
ever, it must at least mean that a discovery of objects not named in the search warrant is
always inadvertent, without regard to the personal hopes or expectations of the executing of-
ficers, if there were not sufficient grounds to justify the issuance of a warrant which also
named those objects as among the things to be seized." WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND
SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT § 4.1 (d), at 351 (2d ed. 1987).
63. Benner, 533 N.E.2d at 709-10.
64. Hare, 589 F.2d at 1295. An application of the probable cause standard to the facts
of Horton raises an interesting issue. In Horton the investigating officer determined that there
was probable cause to search the robbery suspect's home for the proceeds of the robbery and
for the weapons used by the robbers. Horton v. California, 110 S. Ct. 2301, 2304 (1990). The
officer's affidavit for a search warrant made reference to police reports that described the pro-
ceeds and the weapons, but the warrant issued by the magistrate only authorized a search for
the proceeds. Id. This indicates that the magistrate determined that no probable cause existed
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Coolidge supports the proposition that the inadvertence limita-
tion on the plain view doctrine should be interpreted to mean that
the police must be without probable cause to believe the evidence
will be discovered.65 A close reading of Coolidge reveals that the
Court "meant only to condemn warrantless seizures when a warrant
could have been obtained."66 The Coolidge plurality provided that
when the police "know in advance" the location of certain evidence
and intend to seize it, they must obtain a warrant particularly
describing that evidence.67 To "know in advance" the location of cer-
tain evidence is tantamount to having probable cause to believe that
such evidence will be discovered. 68 Under Coolidge the discovery of
evidence is inadvertent if the police did not "know in advance" the
location of the evidence.69 Because "knowledge in advance" is the
functional equivalent of probable cause, the interpretation of inad-
vertence most faithful to Coolidge is that which construes inadver-
tence to mean that "the police must be without probable cause to
believe evidence would be discovered."1
7 0
Application of this probable cause standard (foes, however, pre-
sent practical problems of proof.7 1 Most notably, "the traditional
roles on the issue of probable cause" are reversed. 2 The prosecution
will seek to show that the police did not have probable cause and
that the discovery was therefore inadvertent, while the defendant
will seek to establish that the police did have probable cause and
that the discovery was not inadvertent. 73 It has been suggested that
this "anomalous situation" will encourage police untruthfulness. '
Notwithstanding such difficulties, interpreting inadvertence to mean
that the police must be without probable cause to believe evidence
would be discovered is the most appropriate means of condemning
to believe the weapons would be discovered at the suspect's home. If inadvertence is construed
to mean a lack of probable cause to believe evidence would be discovered, it would follow that
discovery of the weapons was in fact inadvertent.
65. Horton, I10 S. Ct. at 1294.
66. Id.
67. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 469-70 (1971).
68. United States v. Hare, 589 F.2d 1291, 1294 (6th Cir. 1979).
69. Coolidge, 403 U.S. at 469-70.
70. Hare, 589 F.2d at 1294.
71. Kalven, supra note 35, at 245.
72. United States v. Liberti, 616 F.2d 34, 38 (2d Cir. 1980) (Newman, J., concurring),
cert. denied, 446 U.S. 952 (1980).
73. Kalven, supra note 35, at 245.
74. Kalven, supra note 35, at 245. The fear is that a police officer will untruthfully
testify that he was without probable cause. Kalven, supra note 35, at 245. The probable cause
approach has been further criticized because it places the defendant "in the position of probing
for law enforcement information and thereby risking the integrity of continuing criminal inves-
tigations." Liberti, 616 F.2d at 38.
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warrantless seizures when a warrant could have been obtained. 75
IV. Horton v. California: Abandoning the Inadvertence
Requirement
Horton held that the warrantless. seizure of evidence in plain
view is permissible under the Fourth Amendment even if the discov-
ery of that evidence was not inadvertent. 76 As such, inadvertent dis-
covery is no longer a relevant consideration in examining the consti-
tutionality of the warrantless seizure of evidence in plain view.
77
The facts that gave rise to the decision in Horton are relatively
straightforward. Terry Brice Horton was identified both by the vic-
tim and by a witness as one of two men who had committed an
armed robbery.78 The investigating police officer determined that
there was probable cause to search Horton's residence for the pro-
ceeds of the robbery and for weapons used by the robbers. 79 The
officer's affidavit for a search warrant made reference to police re-
ports that described the proceeds and the weapons, but the warrant
issued by the magistrate only authorized a search for the proceeds.80
The investigating officer searched Horton's residence, but did not
find the stolen property particularly described in the warrant.8 " Dur-
ing the course of the search, however, the officer discovered the
weapons in plain view and seized them.82 Horton was subsequently
placed under arrest. The investigating officer later testified that in
addition to searching for the stolen property described in the war-
rant, he also was interested in finding other evidence that implicated
75. United States v. Hare, 589 F.2d 1291, 1294 (6th Cir. 1979). One commentator has
said that though courts have not agreed on the degree of expectation required to make a
discovery of evidence inadvertent, "the better position seems to be that a discovery is inadver-
tent even if the police suspected they would find an item, unless they had probable cause to
obtain a warrant to search for it.' Jackland H. Bloom, Jr., The Law Office Search: An Emerg-
ing Problem and Some Suggested Solutions, 69 GEO. L.J. 1, 85-86 n.439 (1980). It has also
been observed that "[p]robable cause is necessary in the inadvertence requirement to prevent
the police from conducting a planned warrantless seizure on plain view and manipulating the
warrant requirement to defeat the Fourth Amendment. JOHN WESLEY HALL, SEARCH AND
SEIZURE § 3:13 (2d ed. 1991).
76. Horton v. California, 110 S. Ct. 2301, 2308-10 (1990).




81. Horton v. California, I10 S. Ct. 2301, 2304 (1990).
82. Id. at 2305. The officer also seized other evidence connecting Horton with the rob-
bery. Id. The officer viewed additional handguns and rifles in Horton's home, but did not seize
them because there was no probable cause to believe they were associated with criminal activ-
ity. Id. at 2305 n.I.
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Horton in the robbery, including the weapons. 8
The trial court refused to suppress the weapons seized from
Horton's home, notwithstanding Horton's contention that Coolidge
required suppression because the weapons were not inadvertently dis-
covered. 4 A jury convicted Horton of armed robbery. 85 The Califor-
nia Court of Appeals affirmed, rejecting Horton's argument that
Coolidge required suppression of the weapons.8 6 That court instead
relied on the California Supreme Court's decision in North v. Supe-
rior Court.87 In North the California Supreme Court had declined to
require inadvertence because Coolidge was a plurality opinion and
therefore not binding authority. 88 The California Supreme Court de-
nied Horton's request for review. 89 The United States Supreme
Court granted certiorari.9"
The issue before the United States Supreme Court in Horton
was "[w]hether the warrantless seizure of evidence of crime in plain
view is prohibited by the Fourth Amendment if the discovery of the
evidence was not inadvertent."'" In an opinion by Justice Stevens,
the Court concluded that "even though inadvertence is a characteris-
tic of most legitimate 'plain view' seizures, it is not a necessary
condition.
92
The Horton Court undertook abandonment of the inadvertence
requirement by first summarizing the plain view doctrine as formu-
lated in Coolidge."a After setting forth the two limitations the Coo-
lidge plurality placed on the plain view doctrine, namely, "that plain
view alone is never enough to justify the warrantless seizure of evi-
dence" 94 and "that the discovery of evidence in plain view must be
inadvertent," 95 the Horton Court concluded that the former limita-
tion was sufficient to support the Court's judgment in Coolidge."6 By
83, Id.
84. Id.
85, Id. at 2304-05.
86. Unpublished Opinion of the Court of Appeals of the State of California, Sixth Ap-
pellate District, filed Nov. 30, 1988.
87. North v. Superior Court, 502 P.2d 1305 (Cal. 1972).
88. Id. at 1308.
89. Unpublished Order of the California Supreme Court, filed March 15, 1989, denying
review.
90. Horton v. California, 110 S. Ct. 2301 (1989).
91. Id. at 2304.
92. Id. Justice Stevens delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Rehn-
quist and Justices White, Blackmun, O'Connor, Scalia and Kennedy joined. Justice Brennan
filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justice Marshall joined.
93. Id. at 2306-07.
94. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 468 (1971).
95. Id. at 469.
96. Horton v. California, 10 S. Ct. 2301, 2305-06 (1990). The Court explained that the
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doing so, the Horton Court dismissed the Coolidge plurality's discus-
sion of inadvertence as mere dicta because it was not essential to the
judgment in that case. 7
Having dismissed as dicta what all but a handful of lower courts
had treated as the law for nearly twenty years, the Horton Court
then squarely addressed the inadvertence requirement and sought to
justify its abandonment. 98 The Court noted two specific flaws in the
reasoning underlying the inadvertent discovery rule.99 First, the
Court expressed dissatisfaction with what it viewed as the overly
subjective focus of the inadvertence requirement. 100 The Court pos-
ited that "evenhanded law enforcement is best achieved by the appli-
cation of objective standards of conduct, rather than standards that
depend upon the subjective state of mind of the officer."10 1 The ma-
jority in Horton found that even though an officer is subjectively in-
terested in an item of evidence and fully expects to discover that
evidence in the course of the search, seizure of that evidence is per-
missible under the Fourth Amendment, provided the search is con-
fined by the terms of a warrant or a valid exception to the warrant
requirement. 102 Any lingering doubts about the majority's "enthusi-
asm for discarding"10 3 the inadvertence requirement because of its
perceived subjective nature were answered when the Court con-
cluded that:
If [an officer] has a valid warrant to search for one item and
merely a suspicion concerning the second, whether or not it
amounts to probable cause, we fail to see why that suspicion
should immunize the second item from seizure if it is found dur-
ing a lawful search for the first.104
The Court's suggestion that the inadvertence requirement must
be abandoned because it depends too much on the subjective state of
mind of the officer is highly problematic. Most important, a careful
reading of Coolidge reveals that inadvertence in no way depends on
seizure of defendant's automobile in Coolidge was invalid not because of the inadvertence
limitation, but because the incriminating character of the automobile was not "immediately
apparent" and because the police in Coolidge did not have a lawful right of access to the
automobile itself. Id. at 2306.
97. Id. at 2308. "In all events, we are satisfied that the absence of inadvertence was not
essential to the Court's rejection of the State's 'plain view' argument in Coolidge." Id.
98. Id. at 2308-11.
99. Id. at 2308.
100. Id. at 2308-09.
101. Horton v. California, I 10 S. Ct. 2301, 2308-09 (1990).
102. Id.
103. Id. at 2312 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
104. Id. at 2309.
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the subjective state of mind of the officer. To the contrary, the dis-
covery of a particular item of evidence is inadvertent when the police
were without probable cause to believe that the; evidence would be
discovered. 10 5 If an officer had probable cause to believe a particular
item of evidence would be discovered, then the discovery of that evi-
dence could never be inadvertent. On the other hand, when an officer
was without probable cause to believe a particular item of evidence
would be discovered, then the discovery of thait evidence is always
inadvertent.10 6 As such, inadvertence depends not on the subjective
state of mind of the officer, but rather on the entirely objective deter-
mination of whether the officer had probable cause to believe a par-
ticular item of evidence would be discovered.107 By presuming that
the inadvertent discovery rule is subjective in nature and by discard-
ing it for that reason, the Horton Court was incorrect.
The second flaw of the inadvertency rule identified by the ma-
jority in Horton concerns the presumption that the rule is necessary
to prevent the police from engaging in general searches.10 8 The ma-
jority dismissed this notion as unpersuasive because the privacy in-
terest invaded by a general search is adequately protected by the
Fourth Amendment's particularity requirement and by the require-
ment that a warrantless search be limited by the exigency that justi-
fied its initiation. 9 The Court concluded that when these dual re-
quirements are adhered to and a police officer has a lawful right of
access, "no additional Fourth Amendment interest is furthered by
requiring that the discovery of evidence be inadvertent."110
Here the majority once again displays a fundamental misunder-
standing of the inadvertence requirement formulated in Coolidge.
First, while it is true that the inadvertent discovery rule furthers no
privacy interest, it was never intended to do so.111 "The plain view
doctrine is grounded on the proposition that once police are lawfully
in a position to observe an item first-hand, its owners privacy interest
105. United States v. Hare, 589 F.2d 1291, 1294 (6th Cir. 1979). See supra notes 61-70
and accompanying text.
106. See cases cited supra note 61.
107. See Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175-76 (1949). Brinegar suggested
that if probable cause was to be found, the facts must be such as would warrant a belief by a
man of reasonable caution. Id. See also LAFAVE, supra note 62, § 3.2(b), at 567.
108. Horton v. California, 110 S. Ct. 2301, 2309 (1990).
109. Id.
110. Id. at 2309-10.
III. Id. at 2313 (Brennan, J., dissenting). "It is true that the inadvertent discovery re-
quirement furthers no privacy interests. The requirement in no way reduces the scope of a
search or the number of places into which officers may look. But it does protect possessory
interests." Id.
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in that item is lost; the owner may retain the incidents of title and




The plain view doctrine governs the warrantless seizure of evi-
dence and is only concerned with searches to the extent that the of-
ficer must be in a place he has a lawful right to be when the evi-
dence comes into plain view. 3 The inadvertent discovery rule is
aimed not at preserving the privacy interests implicated in a search,
but instead is aimed at protecting an individual's possessory interest
in property implicated in a seizure." 4 This possessory interest in
property is guarded by the Fourth Amendment prohibition against
unreasonable seizures and by the particularity requirement.1 5 When
"the police know in advance the location of the evidence and intend
to seize it," no exigency prevents a police officer from procuring a
warrant issued upon probable cause and particularly describing the
item to be seized." 6 "Prior review by a neutral and detached magis-
trate is the time-tested means of effectuating Fourth Amendment
rights."1
17
Absent some exigency, the decision to invade an individual's
constitutionally protected possessory interest in property is too im-
portant to be made by ambitious police officers "engaged in the often
competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime."" 8 By suggesting that
"no additional Fourth Amendment interest is furthered by requiring
that the discovery of evidence be inadvertent," the majority in Hor-
ton ignores an individual's Fourth Amendment possessory interest in
property.
V. A Plain View Doctrine Without the Inadvertence Requirement:
Specific Fourth Amendment Concerns and the Problem of Pretex-
tual Fourth Amendment Activity
The Supreme Court's rejection of the inadvertence requirement
jeopardizes the specific commands of the Fourth Amendment and
112. Illinois v. Andreas, 463 U.S. 765, 771 (1983).
113. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 446 (1971).
114. See Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 328 (1987). "Although the interest protected
by the Fourth Amendment injunction against unreasonable searches is quite different from
that protected by its injunction against unreasonable seizures, neither the one nor the other is
of inferior worth or necessarily requires only lesser protection." Id.
115. Horton v. California, I10 S. Ct. 2301, 2311 (1990) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
116. Coolidge, 403 U.S. at 470-71.
117. United States v. United States District Court, 407 U.S. 297, 318 (1972).
118. Horton, 110 S. Ct. at 2312 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting Johnson v. United
States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948)). The Supreme Court has stated, "As to what is to be taken,
nothing is left to the discretion of the officer executing the warrant." Marron v. United States,
275 U.S. 192, 196 (1927).
96 DICKINSON LAW REVIEW SPRING 1992
invites police officers to rely on the plain view doctrine as part of a
pretext to make an otherwise unjustified warrantless seizure.
A. Specific Fourth Amendment Concerns
Abandonment of the inadvertent discovery rule sacrifices the
Fourth Amendment prohibition against unreasonable seizures and
the Fourth Amendment requirement that a warrant, issued upon
probable cause, particularly describe the thing to be seized.
Absent exigent circumstances, a warrantless seizure is a per se
unreasonable invasion of an individual's constitutionally protected
possessory interest in property. 1 9 When the discovery of evidence in
plain view is not inadvertent, 120 no exigency prevents a police officer
from procuring a warrant issued upon probable cause and particu-
larly describing the item to be seized." Moreover, to "excuse of-
ficers from the general requirement of a warrant to seize [when] the
officers know the location of the evidence, have probable cause to
seize it, intend to seize it, and yet do not bother to obtain a warrant
particularly describing that evidence," would constitute a flagrant vi-
olation of the Fourth Amendment's particularity requirement.
22
B. The Problem of Pretextual Fourth Amendment Activity
Abandonment of the inadvertence requirement raises the prob-
lem of pretextual Fourth Amendment activity.1 23 Portions of the
Horton opinion seem to invite police officers to rely on the plain view
doctrine as part of a pretext to make an otherwise unjustified war-
rantless seizure. The majority found that a valid warrant to search
for one item authorizes an officer to seize a second item discovered
during a lawful search for the first item, even if prior to the search
the officer had probable cause to believe the second item would be
discovered.124 Such a rule is troublesome because it affords a police
officer the opportunity to simply rely on an existing valid warrant as
a pretext to seize evidence for which he has not sought and obtained
a warrant.
Additionally, the majority exhibits open dissatisfaction with
119. United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 701 (1983). See supra note 9.
120. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 470 (1971).
121. Id. at 470-71.
122. Horton v. California, 110 S. Ct. 2301, 2312 (1990) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
123. See supra notes 14-18 and accompanying text. It must be noted that two states
which have abandoned the inadvertence requirement have expressly held that the Fourth
Amendment prohibits pretextual activity. See State v. Bussard, 760 P.2d 1197, 1204 n.2
(Idaho 1988); State v. Kelly, 718 P.2d 385, 389 n.l (Utah 1986).
124. Horton, 110 S. Ct. at 2309.
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standards of conduct "that depend on the subjective state of mind of
the officer."'1 2 5 This Comment earlier argued that the Horton Court's
dissatisfaction with the overly subjective focus of the inadvertence
requirement was misplaced because inadvertence depends on proba-
ble cause, and probable cause is a purely objective determination.' 26
Notwithstanding what this Comment detects as a flaw in the Horton
Court's reasoning, it is clear that the majority in Horton renounced
any reliance on the subjective motivations of an officer as a standard
for evaluating the constitutionality of that officer's conduct.'27 This
rejection of the subjective standard creates a potential for pretext
because complete elimination of pretextual Fourth Amendment ac-
tivity often requires an inquiry into the subjective motivation of the
police officer."' Only by engaging in such a subjective inquiry can
police conduct that may be objectively constitutional be revealed as a
pretext to make an otherwise unjustified, and subjectively unconsti-
tutional, warrantless seizure."9
VI. A Proposal
The inadvertent discovery rule must be restored in order to pre-
serve the Fourth Amendment prohibition against unreasonable
seizures and the Fourth Amendment requirement that a warrant
particularly describe the thing to be seized. However, not only must
the inadvertent discovery rule be restored, but an absolute constitu-
tional prohibition on pretextual Fourth Amendment activity 30 must
be set forth as well. The plain view doctrine must not be relied on,
under any circumstances, as part of a pretext to make an otherwise
125. Id. at 2308-09.
126. See supra notes 105-07 and accompanying text.
127. Horton v. California, 110 S. Ct. 2301, 2308 (1990). This rejection of the subjective
standard is consistent with a line of cases beginning with Scott v. United States, 436 U.S. 128
(1978). In Scott a majority of the Court, per Justice Rehnquist, observed that whether police
activity violates the Fourth Amendment should be analyzed exclusively by using "a standard
of objective reasonableness without regard to the underlying intent or motivation of the officers
involved." Id. at 138. See also Maryland v. Macon, 472 U.S. 463 (1985); United States v.
Villamonte-Marquez, 462 U.S. 579 (1983). In Villamonte-Marquez the Supreme Court re-
jected defendant's pretext argument on grounds that the Scott decision dictated a solely objec-
tive standard for evaluating Fourth Amendment conduct. Villamonte-Marquez, 462 U.S. at
584 n.3. Though Macon did not deal with pretext issues directly, the Supreme Court reiterated
the view point that "[w]hether a Fourth Amendment violation has occurred 'turns on an objec-
tive assessment of the officer's actions in light of the facts and circumstances confronting him
at the time,' . . . and not on the officer's actual state of mind at the time the challenged action
was taken." Macon, 472 U.S. at 470-71 (quoting Scott v. United States, 436 U.S. at 136).
128. Burkoff, supra note 14, at 373.
129. Burkoff, supra note 14, at 373.
130. See supra notes 14-18 and accompanying text.
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unjustified warrantless seizure."s ' Thus, for a plain view seizure to be
constitutionally valid, two requirements must be met. 132 First, the
discovery of the evidence must be inadvertent. Second, there must be
no pretext.
To satisfy the restored inadvertence requirement, the police of-
ficer must be without probable cause to believe the evidence will be
discovered. This is the objective prong of the two part plain view
test. When a police officer has probable cause to believe an item of
evidence will be discovered, the Fourth Amendment requires that the
officer obtain a warrant particularly describing that evidence. If
under such circumstances the officer fails to do so and instead makes
a warrantless seizure of the evidence, the officer's conduct is objec-
tively unconstitutional. The conduct is objectively unconstitutional
because no inquiry into the officer's subjective motivation is neces-
sary in order to expose the constitutional violation. The officer had
probable cause regarding the location of the evidence, and no exi-
gency prevented the officer from securing a warrant issued upon
probable cause and particularly describing the item to be seized.' 33
The officer's warrantless seizure of the evidence in plain view, not
inadvertently discovered, is a per se unreasonable invasion of an indi-
vidual's constitutionally protected possessory interest in property.1
3
4
To satisfy the second requirement, the police officer must not
131. See Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 743 (1983). "[T]he police must discover in-
criminating evidence 'inadvertently,' which is to say, they may not 'know in advance the loca-
tion of [certain] evidence and intend to seize it,' relying on the plain-view doctrine only as a
pretense." Id. (quoting Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 470 (1971)).
132. This test is an adaptation of Professor Burkoff's "protocol" for analyzing pretextual
Fourth Amendment activity, which states:
Initially, a court should determine whether a search is objectively constitutional
or unconstitutional. If the search is objectively unconstitutional, a court need
proceed no further. If, however, the search is objectively constitutional, the court
must next determine (if the issue is raised) whether the search was a "bad faith"
search.
Burkoff, supra note 14, at 373 n.45. For other views regarding Fourth Amendment pretexts,
see LAFAVE, supra note 62, § 1.4(e), at 96, § 4.11(e), at 355, § 6.7(d), at 728; James V.
Haddad, Pretextual Fourth Amendment Activity: Another Viewpoint, 18 U. MICH. J. L. REF.
639 (1985). Professor LaFave has proposed that in order to assess the constitutionality of
given police conduct, it should be asked whether "the Fourth Amer.dment activity 'was carried
out in accordance with standard procedures in the local police department.' " If not, then
presumably the police conduct would be deemed arbitrary and unconstitutional. LAFAVE,
supra note 62, § 1.4(e), at 96 (quoting South Dakota v. Opperrian, 428 U.S. 364, 374-75
(1976)). Professor Haddad argues that the Supreme Court has dealt with pretext by setting
forth general Fourth Amendment rules that recognize the possibility of pretext. James V.
Haddad, Pretextual Fourth Amendment Activity: Another Viewpcint, 18 U. MICH. J. L. REF.
639, 651-52 (1985).
133. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 470-71 (1971).
134. Horton v. California, 110 S. Ct. 2301, 2311-12 (1990) (Brennan, J., dissenting)
(citing United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 701 (1983)).
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rely on the plain view doctrine as part of a pretext to make an other-
wise unjustified warrantless seizure. This is the subjective prong of
the two part plain view test. A subjective prong is necessary because
a police officer's conduct may be objectively constitutional, yet an
inquiry into the subjective motivation of the officer may reveal that
the officer intended to circumvent the commands of the Fourth
Amendment. 135 The need to deter such subjectively unconstitutional
police conduct is as great as the need to deter objectively unconstitu-
tional police conduct.
136
A. Combating Objectively Unconstitutional Conduct with a Re-
stored Inadvertence. Requirement
Consider the following hypothetical. 3 7 Suppose Police Officer
has probable cause to search Suspect's premises for evidence of
crime A, and Police Officer has ample opportunity to obtain a war-
rant relating to crime A. Police Officer does not, however, obtain a
warrant to search Suspect's premises for evidence of crime A. In-
stead, Police Officer simply enters Suspect's premises pursuant to an
existing warrant to search Suspect's premises for evidence of a less
serious crime, crime B. Police Officer is really only interested in seiz-
ing evidence relating to the more serious crime A, a crime for which
he has not sought and therefore does not have a warrant. Police Of-
ficer's true interests are evidenced by the fact that once inside Sus-
pect's premises, Police Officer searches only those places most likely
to contain evidence of crime A, but where evidence of crime B could
be hidden. Police Officer discovers evidence of crime A in plain view
and seizes it. Suspect is placed under arrest and charged with crime
A.
Discovery of the evidence of crime A was most certainly not
inadvertent because Police Officer had probable cause to believe that
evidence of crime A would be discovered. 3 8 The evidence of crime A
is, however, admissible under Horton.139 Police Officer was thus able
135. Burkoff, supra note 14, at 373. An inquiry into the subjective motivation of the
officer is "critically necessary in order to insure that law enforcement officers generally will be
deterred, through application of the exclusionary rule, from engaging in pretextual fourth
amendment activity." Burkoff, supra note 14, at 373.
136. Burkoff, supra note 14, at 373.
137. The hypothetical is based on the case of State v. Kelsey, 592 S.W.2d 509 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1979) (evidence excluded because police officers, who had ample opportunity to obtain a
warrant relating to a murder investigation, instead entered the suspect's premises pursuant to a
warrant relating to a drug investigation and searched only the hiding place of the murder
weapon rather than conducting a complete "top to bottom" search for drugs).
138. See United States v. Hare, 589 F.2d 1291, 1294-95 (6th Cir. 1979).
139. Horton v. California, 110 S. Ct. 2301, 2309 (1990).
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to simply rely on the existing valid warrant relating to crime B as a
pretext to make an otherwise unjustified warrantless seizure of the
evidence of crime A. As such, Police Officer managed to circumvent
prior review by a neutral and detached magistrate and seize the evi-
dence of crime A based solely on his own unilateral determination of
probable cause. In this instance, the result reached under Horton is
profoundly damaging to Fourth Amendment principles.
Notice that Police Officer had probable cause to believe that
evidence of crime A would be discovered, yet Police Officer failed to
secure a warrant particularly describing that evidence. Police Of-
ficer's warrantless seizure of the evidence of crime A was, therefore,
objectively unconstitutional. The warrantless seizure was objectively
unconstitutional in that no inquiry into Police Officer's subjective
motivation is necessary in order to expose the constitutional viola-
tion. Police Officer had probable cause regarding the location of the
evidence of crime A, and no exigency prevented Police Officer from
obtaining a warrant issued upon probable cause and particularly
describing the item to be seized.14 0 Police Officer's warrantless
seizure of the evidence in plain view, not inadvertently discovered,
was a per se unreasonable invasion of Suspect's constitutionally pro-
tected possessory interest in property.." " Restoration of the inadver-
tent discovery rule will combat this type of objectively unconstitu-
tional pretextual activity.
B. Combating Subjectively Unconstitutional Conduct with a No
Pretext Requirement
It is possible for a plain view seizure to be objectively constitu-
tional under the restored inadvertence requirement, yet subjectively
unconstitutional under a requirement prohibiting pretextual Fourth
Amendment activity. Under such circumstances, the inadvertence re-
quirement alone is insufficient to prevent unconstitutional police con-
duct. Instead, a subjective inquiry is necessary to uncover what
amounts to subjectively unconstitutional police conduct. 42
Consider the following hypothetical. 4" Suppose Police Officer
140. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 470-71 (1971).
141. Horton, 110 S. Ct. at 2311-12 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citing United States v.
Place, 462 U.S. 696, 701 (1983)).
142. Burkoff, supra note 14, at 373 n.45.
143. The hypothetical is based on the case of State v. Bruzzese, 463 A.2d 320 (N.J.
1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1030 (1984). In Bruzzese, the defendant was suspected of bur-
glary. A detective who had a suspicion that evidence implicating the defendant in a burglary
would be discovered at defendant's home entered defendant's home pursuant to an outstanding
warrant for the arrest of defendant for contempt of court. Id. at 322. While in the defendant's
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lacks probable cause to search Suspect's premises for evidence of
crime A, but Police Officer has a suspicion that such evidence would
be discovered at Suspect's premises. Prompted by his desire to find
evidence of crime A, Police Officer enters Suspect's premises pursu-
ant to an existing warrant to search Suspect's premises for evidence
of a less serious crime, crime B. Police Officer is really only inter-
ested in seizing evidence relating to the more serious crime A, for
which he lacked the necessary probable cause to secure a warrant.
Police Officer's true interests are evidenced by the fact that once in-
side Suspect's premises, Police Officer searches only those places
most likely to contain evidence of crime A, but where evidence of
crime B could be hidden. Police Officer discovers evidence of crime
A in plain view and seizes it. Suspect is placed under arrest and
charged with crime A.
Discovery of the evidence of crime A was inadvertent because
Police Officer did not have probable cause to believe that evidence of
crime A would be discovered. 44 The evidence of crime A is most
certainly admissible under Horton. The evidence of crime A would
also be admissible under the restored inadvertent discovery rule.
However, the determination that the discovery was inadvertent and,
consequently, that the seizure was objectively constitutional, is not
conclusive as to the constitutionality of Police Officer's conduct.
When a plain view seizure is objectively constitutional, there must
next be an inquiry into the subjective motivation of the officer in
order to determine whether it was the officer's intention to rely on
the plain view doctrine as part of a pretext to make an otherwise
unjustified warrantless seizure.14 5 Though the Horton Court suggests
that such a subjective inquiry is inappropriate, 1 " only by engaging
in such a subjective inquiry can police conduct that may be objec-
tively constitutional be revealed as simply an attempt to circumvent
the commands of the Fourth Amendment.
In the preceding hypothetical, inquiry into Police Officer's sub-
jective motivation would reveal that Police Officer relied on the plain
view doctrine as part of a pretext to make an otherwise unjustified
warrantless seizure of the evidence of crime A. The actual reason for
the search of Suspect's premises was not to investigate crime B. In-
stead, the actual reason for the search was to search for and seize
home, the detective seized from plain view a pair of boots with a distinctive sole matching the
unusual footprints found at the burglary scene. Id. at 323.
144. See United States v. Hare, 589 F.2d 1291, 1294-95 (6th Cir. 1979).
145. Burkoff, supra note 14, at 373 n.45.
146. Horton v. California, I 10 S. Ct. 2301, 2308-09 (1990).
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evidence of crime A without probable cause to do so. 1' 7 Police Of-
ficer's conduct was, therefore, subjectively unconstitutional. An abso-
lute prohibition on pretextual Fourth Amendment activity would re-
quire that the evidence of crime A be suppressed.
The difficulties inherent in uncovering subjectively unconstitu-
tional conduct must be recognized.1 48 It has been said that "sending
state and federal courts on an expedition into the mind of police of-
ficers would produce a grave and fruitless misallocation of judicial
resources."' 149 Yet, as Justice Holmes once remarked: "If justice re-
quired [a] fact to be ascertained, the difficulty in doing so is no
ground for refusing to try."' 50 Moreover, because the burden of
proving an unconstitutional motive falls on the defendant,' 5 ' it is
likely that any difficulties of proof will benefit the prosecution.' 52
There is no good reason to deny defendants the opportunity to estab-
lish that police conduct was subjectively unconstitutional. If defend-
ants are able to make the necessary showing, they should benefit
therefrom. 5"
147. John M. Burkoff, The Pretext Search Doctrine: Now You See It, Now You Don't,
17 U. MICH. J. L. REF. 523, 539 (1984).
148. Professor Amsterdam has noted:
[Slurely the catch is not worth the trouble of the hunt when courts set out to
beg the secret motivations of police in this context. A subjective purpose to do
something that the applicable legal rules say there is sufficient objective cause to
do can be fabricated all too easily and undetectable.
Anthony G. Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REV. 349, 436-
37 (1974).
149. Massachusetts v. Painten, 389 U.S. 560, 565 (1968) (White, J., dissenting from
dismissal of writ of certiorari as improvidently granted).
150. OLIVER W. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 48 (1881).
151. Alexander E. Eiseman, Note, Addressing the Pretext Problem: The Role of Sub-
jective Police Motivation In Establishing Fourth Amendment Violations, 63 B.U.L. REV. 223,
276 n.258 (1983). In justification of why the burden of proving pretextual motive should fall
on the defendant, it has been argued that:
To force the government to prove a negative - the absence of improper motives
- every time a defendant raises a pretext claim could put a considerable strain
on the criminal justice system and "press the exclusionary rule into service in
such extreme situations [that it would] afford ammunition to those who seek
total abolition of the exclusionary rule."
Id. (quoting WESLEY LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMEND-
MENT § 1.2(g), at 13 (Supp. 1982)).
152. Haddad, supra note 132, at 685. Professor Haddad argues that once the burden of
proving pretextual motive is placed on the defendant, the difficulties inherent in uncovering
subjectively unconstitutional conduct are no longer sufficient to defeat an individual motivation
approach to combat pretextual Fourth Amendment activities. "The worst that one could say is
that under such an approach, because of the difficulty of proof, the prosecution would some-
times benefit from evidence through pretextual fourth amendment activity." Haddad, supra
note 132, at 685.
153. For examples of possible means by which a defendant may establish pretext, see
Eiseman, supra note 151, at 275-77.
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VII. Conclusion
In Coolidge v. New Hampshire"' the Fourth Amendment was
deemed to prohibit the warrantless seizure of evidence in plain view
unless the discovery of that evidence was inadvertent. 155 In Horton v.
California'56 the United States Supreme Court held that the war-
rantless seizure of evidence in plain view is permissible under the
Fourth Amendment even if the discovery of that evidence was not
inadvertent.' 57 In the wake of Horton, inadvertent discovery is not a
relevant consideration in examining the constitutionality of the war-
rantless seizure of evidence in plain view.1
58
Abandonment of the inadvertent discovery rule sacrifices the
Fourth Amendment prohibition against unreasonable seizures and
the Fourth Amendment requirement that a warrant, issued upon
probable cause, particularly describe the thing to be seized. 5 9 More-
over, abandonment of the inadvertent discovery rule tends to invite
pretextual Fourth Amendment activity.6 0 Restoration of the inad-
vertence requirement will preserve the fundamental Fourth Amend-
ment interests implicated in a plain view seizure and will prevent
objectively unconstitutional pretextual activity. An additional no pre-
text requirement is necessary to combat those situations in which a
plain view seizure may be objectively constitutional, yet an inquiry
into the subjective motivation of the officer would reveal that the
officer's intention was simply to circumvent the commands of the
Fourth Amendment.' 6 '
For a plain view seizure to be constitutionally sound, two re-
quirements must be met.162 First, the discovery of the evidence must
be inadvertent. The police officer must be without probable cause to
believe the evidence will be discovered. When the discovery is inad-
vertent, the plain view seizure is objectively constitutional. Second,
there must be no pretext. The police officer must not rely on the
plain view doctrine as part of a pretext to make an otherwise unjusti-
fied warrantless seizure. When a police officer, whose conduct may
be objectively constitutional, intends to use the plain view doctrine as
a means to circumvent the commands of the Fourth Amendment, his
154. 403 U.S. 443 (1971).
155. Id. at 469-71.
156. Horton v. California, 110 S. Ct. 2301 (1990).
157. Id. at 2304.
158. id.
159. Id. at 2311-12 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
160. Id. at 2313 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
161. Burkoff, supra note 14, at 373-74.
162. See supra note 132.
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conduct is subjectively unconstitutional. Strict adherence to both of
these requirements will preserve the integrity of the Fourth Amend-
ment and frustrate pretextual activity.
Robert Eyer
